Introduction
As is well known, Wittgenstein had a life-long interest in the philosophy of colour, from the Tractatus all the way to the last notebooks that were posthumously published as two books, Remarks on Colour (1977 Colour ( /2005 and On Certainty (1975) . Clemens Brentano (1838 -1917 ), or David Katz (1884 -1953 (Bouveresse 2004 , Brenner 1982 , Lee 1999 , 2005 , McGinn 1991 , Rove 1991 , Vendler 1995 , Westphal 1987 .
One aim of my talk is to add a new "foil" to this list: I want to make plausible that a number of Wittgenstein's remarks on colour are responses to late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century British and American work on the psychology and anthropology of colour. I am not the first to put forward this idea -it is mentioned in a recent paper by the historian of science Simon Schaffer (2010: 279) . I have a second aim, too. I want to argue that Wittgenstein's comments are still of systematic interest today. The link between the historical thesis and the systematic concern is established by the fact that a very influential body of contemporary work in the anthropology of colour is strongly influenced by the early British work. Presumably, if Wittgenstein's comments work as criticism of the latter, it will also weaken the appeal of the former.
My paper falls into three parts. Section 2 gives an introduction to the relevant psychological and anthropological studies. Section 3 situates some of Wittgenstein's comments vis-à-vis these investigations. Chapter 4 summarises my observations.
The Psychology and Anthropology of Colour
In 1898-99 a number of British psychologists and anthropologists went on a Cambridge-led expedition to the islands in the Torres Strait (between Australia and Papua New Guinea) to investigate the islanders from various anthropological, psychological, physiological and linguistic perspectives. The main results were later published as the Reports of the Cambridge anthropological expedition to Torres Straits (1901 Straits ( -1935 . The expedition and its results are generally regarded as a landmark event in the history of social anthropology (Herle and Rouse 1996 , Kuklick 1994 , Saunders 2000 , Slobodin 1978 , Stocking 1995 . 3 The leader of the expedition was the anthropologist and zoologist A. C.
Haddon. Other members included W. McDougall, C. S. Myers, S. Ray, W. H. R.
Rivers, C. G. Seligman, S. Ray, and A. Wilkin. Most important for this paper is the work of the Cambridge anthropologist, neurologist, psychiatrist and psychologist William Halse Rivers Rivers (1864 -1922 (Slobodin 1978) . He investigated the perception and classification of colours on three islands, Mabuaig, Mer (= Murray Island), and Kiwai.
The central context for Rivers' investigations were earlier claims by English and German classical philologists according to which the human colour perception "as we know it" is of recent origin. For instance, William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898), the four-time British prime-minister and Homer scholar, argued in 1858 -on the basis of philological evidence -that Homer and his audience were unable to distinguish colours, that is, that Homer and his audience was able only to distinguish between differences in brightness. The German philosopher and philologist Lazarus Geiger (1829-1870) later offered an evolutionary scheme according to which colour perception developed through distinct stages. Evolutionary development adds more and more colours in the order of the spectrum. The last colour that Westerners have learnt to discriminate has been blue (Kuklick 1994 ).
The ideas of Gladstone and Geiger were controversial by the time Rivers undertook his investigations. Rivers wanted to test these ideas experimentally. In setting out to do so, he assumed that the islanders of the Torres Strait were at a lower evolutionary stage than himself and his Cambridge experimental subjects.
Ultimately Rivers thought that his work confirmed Geiger's and Gladstone's claims: 4 "One of the chief interests of the work described in this report is that it shows that defect in nomenclature for a colour may be associated with defective sensibility for that colour and so far lends some support to the views of Gladstone and Geiger." (Rivers 1901a: 49) In order to get a sense of Rivers' "evidence", we need to take a closer look at his experiments and measurements. A first central tool for studying the colour discrimination of the islanders was "Holmgren's Wools", a device developed in the 1870s to test for colour blindness (Collins and Drever 1925: 61-74; Whipple 1924: 187-9) . A large number of skeins of wools of different colour shades were poured in front of the experimental subject, and the subject was asked to sort them into seven piles. Each pile had one specific colour shade as a starting point or anchor: red, green, pink, pale ("Holmgren's") green, yellow, blue, and violet. Rivers reported the following results. First, "there was a natural tendency to put together all the wools to which the same name was given ..." (Rivers 1901a: 49) . Second, while his subjects did not match red to green or yellow to blue, "confusion between green and blue was very common and also between blue and violet" (1901a: 51). Put differently, "the pale green wool (...) was matched correctly by the majority, but in a large number of cases it was matched with a number of bluish or violet wools ..." (1901a: 49) A second experiment used "Lovibond's tintometer" (Lovibond 1915) . It consists of a tube with slots for inserting small pieces of coloured glass and an eyepiece at one end. In Rivers' set-up, the tintometer was directed at a while surface. Central to the experiment were "three series of coloured glasses, red, 5 yellow and blue, very delicately graded so that each forms a series by means of which one passes from a colour so faint as to be in-distinguishable from colourless glass up to a glass of a high degree of saturation." (Rivers 1901a: 71) The experimental subject was looking through the eyepiece while Rivers inserted different glasses along the described series. The subject had to tell Rivers as soon as she or he was able to identify a colour. The idea was to find the threshold at which colours were recognised correctly. Comparing the islanders' performance with that of English experimental subjects back in Cambridge, Rivers concluded that "the Murray Islander is relatively rather more sensitive to red than the Englishman, and distinctly less sensitive to blue. " (1901a: 73) A third line of inquiry concerned colour nomenclature directly. Rivers asked the islanders to name the colours of standard sets of coloured papers, of various objects of the environment, of the colours in the tintometer, and of Holmgren's wools. The islanders on Murray Island gave one word for red: "mamamamam", but several words for blue: "bulu-bulu", "golegole", "suserisuseri", "gausgaus", "giazgiaz", "lulam gimgam", "akosakos", "soskepusoskep" ("colour adjectives in Murray Island are formed by reduplication from the names of various natural objects. " (1901a: 56) ). The crucial observation for Rivers was that "... there was great definiteness and unanimity in the nomenclature for red ... and very great indefiniteness for blue ... " (1901a: 54-5) . Rivers also suggested an evolutionary perspective on the differences in colour nomenclature on the three islands: "As regards blue, the three languages ... [represent] three stages in the evolution of a nomenclature for this colour. " (1901a: 66) The inhabitants on Kiwai were thought to be at the lowest stage since they had no word for blue at all. The Murray Islanders 6 were more advanced since they had adopted the term blue, or "bulu-bulu", from their English-speaking visitors. And the people of Mubaig were at a still higher level of development insofar as their word "maludgamulnga" "is used definitely for blue, but is also used for green". Alas, even the Mubaig Islanders still sometimes "confused" black and blue (ibid.).
To sum up, Rivers was convinced that "the Papuan is characterized by a certain degree of insensitiveness to blue ..." and that even "... intelligent natives ... Britain. He also interestingly objected to Rivers' translations of native words and expressions. Rivers had translated "golegole" as "black" on the grounds that "gole" means cuttlefish, and that therefore "golegole" ought to stand for the colour of the cuttlefish's ink. Titchener did not find this translation compelling: "… the word gole means, not cuttle ink, but cuttlefish; and it is characteristic of these animals that they change colour, chameleonwise, to suit the colour of their surroundings. May it not be that the thought in the native's mind, when he uses the word gole, is "can't find him," "can't see him"? … And if this is the case, is it not natural that the adjective golegole should be applied to any large expanse within which no discriminable features can be made out? The dark of night, the skin of the body, the expanse of sea and sky …" (1916: 224-5) 9 Of course, if "golegole" does not mean (primarily) black but "not having discriminable features" then the Torres Islanders are not "confused" in applying it to both black and blue surfaces. (a) to (h). Such criteria include, for instance, that basic colour terms should be "monolexemic", "psychologically salient", or not specific to a narrow domain (1969/1999: 6 ).
Berlin and Kay claim to have found that … " … although different languages encode in their vocabularies different numbers of basic colour categories, a total universal inventory of exactly eleven basic colour categories exists from which the eleven or fewer basic colour terms of any given language are always drawn." (1969/1999: 2) These eleven colours are: white, black, red, green, yellow, blue, brown, purple, pink, orange, grey. Moreover, however many basic colours -two to eleven -a given language encodes, there are "strict limitations on which categories it may encode".
The idea is best captured in the following well-known picture (1969/1999: Wittgenstein thus describes a possibility: the tribesmen apply the same term to what we call "red" and "green"; but they are able to learn our terms. Their use of the modifiers "sharp" and "blunt" in combination with their word for "red or green"
shows that they are able to discriminate what we call "red" and "green". Note that
Wittgenstein seeks to explain the tribesmen's vocabulary not in terms of an alleged cognitive deficit, or evolutionary lag, but in terms of their needs and aims: "It's just that the difference between red and green isn't as important to them as it is to us."
(1990: 221) Wittgenstein also makes the further suggestion that such classification might also plausibly find an expression in an artistic convention: "A type of painting, in which the illuminated side of figures is always painted green, the shadows always red" (1990: 223). So much for Rivers' claim that not having an equivalent of our term "blue" must be an expression of a lack of aesthetic appreciation of nature. For
Wittgenstein the key explanatory resource instead is salience and practical interests (cf. 1980a: 47, 1980a: 626, 1988: 121, 115-238 ).
14 Example II: (To us) yellow objects are judged by members of another culture to be similar to (to us) blue objects; and (to us) green objects are judged by members of another culture to be similar to (to us) red objects.
"Imagine a use of language (a culture) in which there was a common name for green and red on the one hand and yellow and blue on the other.
Suppose, e.g., that there were two castes, one the patrician caste, wearing blue, red and green garments, the other, the plebeian, wearing blue and yellow. ... Asked what a red patch and a green patch have in common, a man of our tribe would not hesitate to say that there were both patrician." (1958/2007: 134) If the members of this culture did use the same terms in these cases, Rivers, Gladstone and Geiger would presumably judge them to be on a lower evolutionary stage than Westerners. This is not Wittgenstein's position. He offers a social-cultural explanation that treats the other culture in a neutral, non-evaluative way. The members of the other culture act as we could imagine ourselves acting.
Example III: (To us) light blue objects are judged by members of another culture not to be similar to, and not to have something in common with, dark blue objects:
"We could also easily imagine a language (and that means again a culture) in which there existed no common expression for light blue and dark blue, in which the former, say, was called 'Cambridge', the latter 'Oxford'. Wittgenstein calls "colour poles"; terms around which we organise our "colour geometry". For us such colour poles are red, blue, yellow (and perhaps also green).
We use these poles to define other colours. We say, for example, that purple is a bluish red. Assume now that there were a different culture with different colour poles, say purple, orange, blue-green, and yellow-green. And members of that other culture call red a purplish orange. Wittgenstein is doubtful whether such a language would be translatable into ours: "this tribe and we couldn't learn one another's language." And he likens this difference in colour poles to the difference between a colour-blind and a normally seeing person (1988: 19; cf. 1988: 138, 258-9; 1980a: 622) . This suggests once more that for Wittgenstein the colour vision of people we call "colour-blind" need not be regarded as deficient; it is just a different way of organising the space of colours. The point is explicitly made elsewhere: "We speak of 'colour-blindness' and call it a defect. But there could easily be several different abilities, none of which is clearly inferior to others." (1977 ( /2005 (c) The third example of a difference in seeing is an encounter between us and a colour-blind tribe:
"There could very easily be a tribe of people who are all colour-blind and who nonetheless live well; but would they have developed our colour names, and how would their nomenclature correspond to ours? What would their natural language be like?? Do we know? Would they perhaps have 18 three primary colours: blue, yellow and a third which takes the place of red and green? -What if we were to encounter such a tribe and wanted to learn their language? We would no doubt run into certain difficulties." (1977 ( /2005 cf. 1977 cf. /2005 2000: 176 3r-v, 176 
Wittgenstein's point about difficulties in translating the colour vocabulary of a tribe with a different organization of colours in noteworthy not least since it can be read as a criticism of Rivers. After all, Rivers and other authors of his tradition paid little attention to the difficulties of translating the language of a colour-blind tribe. Or put differently, they overlooked the difficulties that arise as we go from one colour-blind person within our society to a whole tribe of the colour-blind.
Although Wittgenstein considers the possibility of very different colour experiences and colour terms, he also feels the pull of our "universalistic intuitions":
"Can't we imagine people having a geometry of colours different from our normal one? ... The difficulty is obviously this: isn't it precisely the geometry of colours that shows us what we're talking about, i.e. that we are talking about colours?" (1977 ( /2005 This consideration puts limits to how much variation in colour perception and colour nomenclature there could be.
(C) Languages without colour concepts
A further pertinent theme in Wittgenstein's reflections on colour concerns languages that do not have a distinct or separate system of colour terms. This idea has sometimes been used as a criticism of Berlin and Kay, and without reference to
Wittgenstein (Kuschel and Monberg 1974, Lucy 1997 ).
Wittgenstein's first example is of a hypothetical linguistic community that, because of the character of its particular natural environment, has no need for colour concepts at all:
"Suppose I were to come to a country where the colour of things -as I would say -changed constantly ... The inhabitants never see unchanging colours. ... It might be that their language lacked words for colours. ... We might explain it by saying that they had little or no use for certain languagegames. " (1980a: 198) More realistic is a second case in which information about colour is encoded together with information about another dimension, here colour and form.
"And what about people who only had colour-shape concepts? Should I say of them that they do not see that a green leaf and a green (1953: 373) . Applied to this context, the grammar of colour judgements enables us to see and reconstruct our explicit and implicit commitments and assumptions about colours. I shall give a brief overview over some of this grammar's central pillars.
(i) A grammar of colour is a study of the "logic" of our colour concepts. "Logic" or "grammar" here contrasts with precisely the mentioned empirical studies: "We do not want to establish a theory of colour (neither a physiological one nor a psychological one), but rather the logic of colour concepts. ..." (1977/2005: I 22) That is to say, the focus is on the language games in which colour terms figure, not on individual-psychological or physiological abilities that allow us to discriminate between colours.
(ii rules governing the use of colour terms) behave similarly to other types of grammatical sentences: for instance, similarly to mathematical theorems. This idea is referred to when Wittgenstein speaks of a "geometry of colours" (1977/2005: 66) or when he writes: "We have a colour system as we have a number system " (1980b: 426; 1981: 357, cf. 1975: 233-4.) To begin with, neither mathematical theorems nor grammatical sentences concerning colour are true in a correspondence-theoretical sense:
"We have a colour system as we have a number system. Do the systems reside on our nature or in the nature of things? How are we to put it? -Not in the nature of numbers or colours. " (1980b: 426) 24 While not true in a correspondence-theoretical sense, grammatical sentences about colour, and thus systems of colour terms, can be more or less useful, given the needs of the respective language community. These sentences and systems are thus naturally related to "general facts of nature" about us and our way of life:
"Then is there something arbitrary about this system? Yes and no. Wittgenstein's main points against Rivers and Berlin and Kay are the following. First, we must not diagnose a conceptual, intellectual or physiological defect in another culture simply on the grounds that its members draw conceptual lines (regarding colour) differently from us. Second, it would be a mistake to draw conclusions about how advanced a culture is on the back of its colour taxonomy.
Third, phenomena we ordinarily classify as instances of colour-blindness need not be regarded as deficiencies in all contexts. Sometimes it might be more naturally to simply speak of a different organization of colours. Fourth, it is arbitrary to treat our colour taxonomy or vision as the standard or framework of analysis for all others.
Fifth, Rivers underestimates the difficulties that might arise when we try to translate the colour terms of another culture. Sixth, if there are languages with form-colour concepts or with a different morphology then Rivers' methodology is not be applicable in a straightforward way.
In the past, reflections on Wittgenstein's importance for the philosophy of the social sciences in general and anthropology in particular have often focused on his "Comments on Frazer" (1993) . If this paper is at least roughly near the mark, then this focus can now be widened by including a good number of Wittgenstein's remarks on colour into the corpus of relevant texts. The following more general precepts can then perhaps be formulated. A study of taxonomies, nomenclatures or vocabularies should be neutral and symmetrical in that the analyst does not
